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The fundamental purpose of a tort trial is to allocate responsibility.
However, attributing fault is difficult, and decades of research in psychol-
ogy have shown that human beings are prone to make systematic errors in
performing this task.  What can be done about this?  The United States and
countries in continental Europe adopt diametrically opposed strategies to
reduce errors in the attribution of responsibility in the courtroom.  Ameri-
can law delegates fact-finding to jurors and makes some type of evidence
inadmissible in court to protect jurors from potentially biasing informa-
tion, such as character evidence.  European legal systems, instead, employ
almost exclusively judges to perform fact-finding and allow character evi-
dence at trial, under the assumption that judges are better than laypeople
in weighing the probative value of this type of evidence.  There is a long-
standing debate among legal scholars on whether the American or the
European approach reduces more trial errors, but the relative performance
of the two legal systems remains largely untested.  This article is the first to
provide evidence on the relative performance of these two systems.  Our
results suggest that jurors fail to correctly apply European rules of charac-
ter evidence.  The American rules on the inadmissibility of character evi-
dence seem therefore a more appropriate choice when fact-finding is
performed by jurors.  We find also that, contrary to jurors, judges apply
European rules correctly and thus reduce the risk of errors in the attribu-
tion of responsibility.  Overall, this result indicates that the American and
the European evidence rules to improve fact-finding are well set up.  None-
theless, we also find that neither of the two systems is able to prevent
factfinders’ errors in the attribution responsibility when these mistakes are
not due to the type of evidence presented at trial but to (unconscious)
beliefs held by factfinders themselves.  We thus propose a set of policies
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that could improve factfinders’ ability to avoid mistakes in attributing
responsibility.
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Introduction
The fundamental purpose of a tort trial is to allocate responsibility.
The factfinder must determine if the defendant is at fault for any harm that
befell the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is at fault, or whether the harm was
the result of unavoidable circumstances.  Attributing fault is a difficult
task, and people often make mistakes doing so.  But doing justice at trial
requires that factfinders attribute fault logically, accurately, and consist-
ently.  Are judges better at allocating responsibility than jurors?
Consider an example.  After many years of hard work, Brenda manages
to buy an old summer house in need of restoration.  Before moving into the
new place, she asks Adam, a local bricklayer, to fix the roof of her house.  A
few months following the reparation, a whirlwind hits various houses in
the area, badly damaging the roof of Brenda’s house, but leaving the other
houses’ roofs intact.  After the incident, Brenda discovers that other build-
ings previously repaired by Adam presented structural problems just a few
months after their reparations took place and accuses him of not having
duly repaired her roof.  Who is at fault— Adam for having negligently
repaired the roof, or is Brenda’s loss an unavoidable product of whirlwinds
and the natural deterioration of old houses?  Legal systems everywhere rely
on factfinders to weigh these circumstances and make these judgments
consistently.  Decades of research, however, suggest that human beings are
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prone to make fundamental mistakes in attributing responsibility: we tend
to underestimate the role of situational factors and overweigh personality-
based explanations for events that we observe.1  When an accident occurs,
we tend to unduly look for someone with a bad character to blame and
downgrade other (situational) explanations for the accident.2  In the exam-
ple above, factfinders that commit this cognitive error will unduly think
that Adam has a propensity to repair roofs negligently and thus blame him
for the accident while underestimating the causal contribution of the whirl-
wind to the loss of Brenda.  To be clear, it is very well possible that Adam’s
negligent behavior caused the accident in that specific occasion, but
research in psychology shows that, generally, human beings have a ten-
dency to underestimate the causal contribution of non-human factors to
the negative events we experience and look for a person to blame.3  This
cognitive error is so embedded in human nature that it is referred to as the
fundamental attribution error (FAE).4  Many legal scholars have expressed
concern that the FAE may lead factfinders to make innocent defendants
liable5 and judges to develop unjust legal doctrines that perpetuate racial
and gender inequalities.6  What can be done about this?
The United States and European civil law countries (hereinafter Euro-
pean countries) tend to adopt opposed strategies to minimize the risks of
errors in the attribution of fault.  European countries employ almost exclu-
sively judges for fact-finding, assuming that they perform well, and better
than jurors, at this task.7  The United States, instead, tends to rely more on
the wisdom of the layperson (i.e., jurors) but adopts stricter evidentiary
1. Jon D. Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345,
1359– 66, (2008); Jon D. Hanson & David G. Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to
the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 129, 153 (2003); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings:
Distortions in the Attribution Process, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
173, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., vol. 10, 1977).
2. See Hanson & McCann, supra note 1, at 1361.
3. See generally Hanson & McCann, supra note 1, at 1359– 66; Hanson & Yosifon,
supra note 1, at 153.
4. Ross, supra note 1, at 184.  This attributional error is sometimes referred to as
correspondence bias. See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal
Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1565– 66
(2005); Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1. See also Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng,
Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s Actual
Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195, 206– 07 (2004); Robert
A. Prentice, Behavioral Economics Applied: Loss Causation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1509,
1537– 38 (2012); Victor D. Quintanilla, (Mis)judging Intent: The Fundamental Attribution
Error in Federal Securities Law, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 195, 200– 02 (2011).
6. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 152– 53 (2010).  On how judges’ and jurors’ biases in tort trials
can create and perpetuate racial and gender inequalities see Goran Dominioni, Biased
Damages Awards: Gender and Race Discrimination in Tort Trials, 1 INT’L COMP., POL’Y &
ETHICS L. REV. 269 (2018).
7. Simona Grossi, A Comparative Analysis Between Italian Civil Proceedings and
American Civil Proceedings Before Federal Courts, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213,
223– 24 (2010).
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rules to limit the use of potentially biasing items of evidence.8  A type of
evidence that is particularly relevant in this regard is the one that regulates
the use of character evidence.  Character evidence informs factfinders
about past behaviors of one of the parties at trial.  Thus, for example,
Brenda may present evidence showing that Adam was negligent in fixing
some of the structural problems of the houses he previously repaired to
prove his negligent behavior in the case at hand.  Many scholars consider
character evidence a type of evidence that may lead judges and jurors to
make faulty attributions at trial.9  Going back to the accident example, the
concern with the FAE is that, when presented with character evidence,
judges and jurors will overestimate the likelihood that the cause of the acci-
dent is the negligent behavior of Adam (who, allegedly, has the disposition
to act negligently) instead of the whirlwind (a situational explanation of
the accident).  European legal systems do not adopt this strict ban.  Instead,
they often dictate judges to assign the lowest probative value to character
evidence.10
Despite the longstanding debate on which of these two systems pro-
duces better trial decisions,11 their relative performance remains largely
untested.  Prominent legal scholars defend the idea that judges are less
prone to commit the FAE at trial on the ground that experience in adjudica-
tion refines judges’ ability to attribute responsibility12 and that individuals
who embark in a judicial career are generally less prone to commit attribu-
tional errors than the general population.13  But, is this so?  This article is
the first to analyze this question empirically.
8. John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility in
Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227, 227– 28 (2003); Grossi, supra note 7, at 246.
9. Frederick Vars, Behavioral Economics and Evidence Law, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 703, 711– 14 (E. Zamir & D. Teichman
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). See also Chris W. Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the
Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1241– 42 (2001) (reviewing this literature).
10. TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE: LA PROVA NEL PROCESSO CIVILE 345
(Michele Taruffo ed., Giuffré Editore, 2012). See also Grossi, supra note 7, at 224 (“The
rules governing evidence do not give much weight to circumstantial evidence and infer-
ences.  They place much more emphasis on direct evidence.”).
11. See Sheldon & Murray, supra note 8, at 228. See also Frederick Schauer, On the
Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV 165, 194 (2006). See gen-
erally David A. Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634 (2009) (reviewing
a long-standing debate on the relative advantages of civil law and Common law trials).
12. Adam Benforado & Jon D. Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Diver-
gent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 349– 50
(2007).
13. Id. at 360.  Relatedly, there is also a widespread belief among U.S. judges and
legal scholars that judges are better able than laypeople to ignore inadmissible items of
evidence, such as character evidence.  On legal scholarship, see, for example, FED. JUDI-
CIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Fourth) § 11.431, at 63– 64 (2004); Leo
Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA.
L. REV. 905, 916 (1971); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1251, 1255– 56 (2005) (reviewing this literature).  On judicial opinions, see
Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345– 46 (1981); State v. Garcia, 397 P.2d 214, 216 (Ariz.
1964); Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179, 183 n.6 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v.
Glover, 405 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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Our article is also the first to analyze whether continental Europe’s
regulation of character evidence is effective in reducing the risk that
factfinders commit the FAE at trial.  In doing so, we complement previous
studies that focused on the effectiveness of American rules on inadmissible
evidence in addressing errors in judicial decision-making,14 thus allowing
a comparison of the performance of the two systems.
We find that laypeople commit errors when applying European rules
of character evidence.  Since these rules aim to prevent errors in the attri-
bution of responsibility, our results show that the European legal system is
not able to prevent mistakes when fact-finding is performed by jurors.
Thus, in jury trials, American rules on the inadmissibility of character evi-
dence seem a more appropriate choice.  Our results also show that judges
are able to correctly apply European rules of character evidence and thus
are more likely to avoid errors in fact-finding when character evidence is
presented at trial.  When taken together, our results indicate that evidence
rules in both the United States and Europe are well set up.
However, our results also indicate that neither of the two systems are
able to prevent judges and jurors from committing errors in the attribution
of responsibility when these mistakes are not due to items of evidence
presented at trial, such as character evidence, but rather to (unconscious)
beliefs held by factfinders themselves.  In particular, we find that the two
groups have a similar propensity to commit the FAE; and that in both sam-
ples, those who have a (unconscious) personal tendency to commit the FAE
consistently assign greater responsibility to tortfeasors.  In particular, we
find that judges and laypeople have a similar propensity to commit the
FAE; and that in both groups participants that have a tendency to commit
the FAE are more likely to hold the defendant responsible for the accident,
regardless of whether character evidence is presented at trial.  This result
suggests that neither the American nor European trials are likely to be bul-
letproof against the FAE.  Given these results, this article also discusses
court practices that could reduce the risks of attributional errors in trial
settings.
The remainder of this work unfolds as follows: Part I introduces the
legal scholarship on the FAE and highlights how psychological research on
this phenomenon has been widely influential in the legal debate.  Part II
illustrates the relation between character evidence and attributional errors.
This part also compares the American and the European approaches to the
regulation of character evidence.  Part III discusses research indicating that
individuals that embark on a judicial career are less prone to commit the
FAE at trial.  We describe the experiment in Part IV.  We report results in
Part V and discuss them in Part VI.  We report limitations in Part VII.  Part
14. For a recent review of this literature see Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, Judicial
Decision-Making A Behavioral Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECO-
NOMICS AND THE LAW 664, 671– 73 (E. Zamir & D. Teichman eds., Oxford Univ. Press,
2014); Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1259.  For a review of psycho-
logical and sociological research on character evidence see generally MIKE REDMAYNE,
CHARACTER IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2015).
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VIII discusses normative implications for the court systems in Europe and
the US.
I. Injustice in The Courtroom: The Fundamental Attribution Error in
Legal Scholarship
Starting from the seminal work by Lee Ross,15 a large body of evi-
dence shows that the FAE is a diffuse phenomenon, at least in the Western
world.16  For instance, a well-known study that is often interpreted as
showing the existence of the FAE is the Milgram’s study on obedience.17  In
this study, participants took part in an experiment allegedly aimed to test
whether memory skills can be improved through the use of punishment.18
Each participant was assigned to the role of “teacher” while an actor pre-
tended to be a participant in the experiment and took the part of the
“learner.”  The learner had to learn pairs of words and remember them
when asked by the teacher.  When the answer provided was wrong, the
teacher was asked to punish the learner by delivering an electric shock of
increasing intensity for each mistake made, up to 450 w.  Unknown to the
participants, these electric shocks were not real.  Nonetheless, the actor
pretended to receive pain from the punishment.  Depending on the degree
of punishment received, the learner started complaining about the pain,
asked to stop the experiment, screamed, and at higher levels of punishment
pretended to have lost his senses.  Sixty-five percent of the participants
went on up to the maximum level of punishment, despite forty U.S. psychi-
atrists having predicted that only 1 out of 1000 would do so.  This result
shows that the psychiatrists failed to understand the determinants of par-
ticipants’ behavior, i.e., they underestimated the power that the request of
the experimenter to harm the learner (a situational factor) had in determin-
ing teachers’ behavior and overestimated the importance of teachers’
unwillingness to harm the learner (a dispositional factor).19
Psychological research of the FAE20 is having a significant impact on
American legal scholarship,21 especially in the areas of tort and criminal
law.  In the tort law sphere, various authors highlight how the FAE skews
15. Ross, supra note 1, at 184– 85.
16. Christopher W. Bauman & Linda J. Skitka, Making Attributions for Behaviors:
The Prevalence of Correspondence Bias in the General Population, 32 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 269, 275 (2010); Incheol Choi, Richard E. Nisbett & Ara Norenzayan, Causal
Attribution Across Cultures: Variation and Universality, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 47, 47– 48
(1999).
17. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1, at 149– 52.
18. For a description of this study see MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 153 (2016).
19. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1, at 149– 52.
20. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1 (reviewing this literature).
21. See Chamallas & Wriggins, supra note 6, at 152; Kang, supra note 5, at 1565– 66.
See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1; Levinson & Peng, supra note 5, at 206– 07;
Prentice, supra note 5, at 1537– 38; Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 200– 02; Jeffrey J. Rach-
linski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics, U. ILL. L. REV.
1675, 1693 (2011).
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tort law decisions against innocent defendants.22  For instance, Prentice
discusses the role of the FAE in determining investors’ compensation in
securities fraud law and argues that it is likely that this phenomenon can
lead to inaccurate findings with regard to the causation requirement.23
Along these lines, Quintanilla claims that the FAE may lead courts to too
easily find intent in the application of federal security law.24  Because of
this, managers are unjustly made liable for their unintentional actions.
Also, research indicates that the FAE may lead to racial and gender injus-
tices in trial settings.25  Various studies show that people are more prone to
commit the FAE when observing negative behaviors of outgroup members
than when confronted with unwarranted conduct of ingroup members.26
Building on this research, prominent legal scholars argue that the FAE may
perpetuate racial and gender injustices in the courtroom.27
Part of the legal scholarship on the FAE has taken a radical step in
highlighting the relevance of this phenomenon for the study of tort law.
This strand of literature, referred to as situationism,28 “[i]s premised on
the social scientific insight that the näıve psychology— that is, the highly
simplified, affirming, and widely held model for understanding human
thinking and behavior— on which our laws and institutions are based is
largely wrong.”29  Situationists’ main claim is that current legal scholar-
ship in general, and the law and economics’ rational actor model in partic-
ular, is built on an erroneous conception of the determinants of human
behavior, which ignores the crucial role that situations play in shaping how
humans behave.30  Starting from these premises, Hanson and McCann
argue that the human tendency to deny the appropriate role played by situ-
ations in determining human conduct may have contributed to producing
an unjust tort law system in which, for instance, smokers bear the harm of
their smoking habits despite corporations largely influencing these habits
through advertisement.31  Hanson and McCann bring their reasoning a
step further.  According to their thesis, cigarette producers consciously
take advantage of the existence of the FAE by advertising smoking as an
expression of freedom, thus spreading the idea that smokers freely choose
to smoke.32  This idea, in turn, influences courts’ perception of the deter-
minants of smoking behavior and thus indirectly affects the attribution of
22. See Levinson & Peng, supra note 5, at 206– 07.
23. See Prentice, supra note 5, at 1537– 38.
24. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 200– 02.
25. Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive
Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461, 464 (1979).
26. See id.; Kang, supra note 5, at 1565– 66.
27. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 6, at 152; Kang, supra note 5, at
1565– 66.
28. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1.
29. Hanson & McCann, supra note 1, at 1359 (citing About Situationsim, SITUATION-
IST, https://thesituationist.wordpress.com/about-situationism/ [https://perma.cc/8SJQ-
29EX] (last visited, December 27, 2019)).
30. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1, at 154.
31. Hanson & McCann, supra note 1, at 1374– 75.
32. Id.
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liability in cigarettes-related tort law cases to the advantage of producers.
This scholarship goes so far as to argue that to avoid inaccuracies in adju-
dication due to the FAE, academics should reform the way in which tort
law is taught in law school.  In particular, Hanson and McCann propose a
situationist model in which students learn to recognize situational forces
that shape human behavior.33
In criminal law, Dripps invites considering the FAE as one of the main
risks for legal decision-making and proposes that legislators should be
more attentive to acquittals based on defenses that redirect the blame
towards a person than to those in which non-human factors justify or
excuse the conduct of the defendant.34  Along these lines, Ross and Shes-
towsky maintain that dispositionism (i.e., the tendency to attribute one’s
behavior to his/her disposition) among factfinders over-restricts the scope
for the recognition of mitigating circumstances that would warrant a more
lenient treatment of criminal defendants.35  Recent literature builds upon
the research on the FAE to argue that incapacitation of past offenders is not
a justification of punishment.36
II. Attribution Errors and the Regulation of Character Evidence in
America and Europe
As shown in Part I, the FAE is widely seen as a key driver of the func-
tioning of the U.S. criminal and tort law systems.  Various authors have
also argued that the American legal system embeds rules and practices that
aim to limit the effect of the FAE on trial outcomes.37  In this respect, a key
set of rules are those that regulate the use of character evidence at trial.
Since character evidence highlights parties’ dispositions by providing
information regarding the consistency of the behavior under scrutiny with
past conduct, it is a type of evidence that is likely to trigger the FAE in trial
settings.38  Indeed, a major rationale underlying the existence of rules that
aim to inhibit the misuse of character evidence is the fear that it may trig-
ger errors in the attribution of responsibility.39  These rules are different in
American law and the law in many European civil law countries.
With some important exceptions, character evidence is not admissible
in U.S. jury trials.  This ban on character evidence is set forth by Federal
Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404.40  This provision is part of a broader set of
rules inspired by epistemic paternalism that regulates the admissibility of
evidence at trial with the aim of preventing the jury from making a deci-
33. Id. at 1398.
34. Dripps, supra note 4, at 1416– 17.
35. Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal
Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2002).
36. Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017).
37. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 12, at 356– 57; Vars, supra note 9, at 711– 14.
38. Vars, supra note 9, at 711– 14.
39. Id.
40. FED. R. EVID. 404.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\52-2\cin201.txt unknown Seq: 9  1-APR-20 13:43
2019 Judges Versus Jurors 243
sion on the basis of items of evidence whose “probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
[and] misleading the jury.”41
Interestingly, the legislative ban on character evidence in American
law is rarely mirrored by a similar rule in continental Europe, where the
utilization of jurors is fairly rare.  Civil law judges are routinely exposed to
a considerable amount of propensity evidence.42  For instance, under Ital-
ian law,43 with some exceptions, this type of evidence is freely admissible
at trial.44
Yet, even in Europe, the use of character evidence is not completely
unregulated.  In fact, while free evaluation of evidence is a core principle of
evidentiary rules in many European countries, factfinders are expected to
evaluate evidence according to rational standards.45  In this connection,
character evidence is often considered an item of evidence with the lowest
probative value.46  Therefore, legal scholars argue that judges cannot hold
the defendant liable when the only evidence available at trial is character
evidence.47  In this sense, European factfinders are expected to not overes-
timate the probative value of this type of evidence.  This expectation can be
seen as an attempt by the legal system to avoid the influence of the FAE on
judicial decisions.
In the present work, we test the effectiveness of this European rule to
reduce the use of character evidence at trial.  In doing so, we shed new light
on the relative performance of American law and European law to reduce
errors in the attribution of responsibility in the courtroom.
III. Attributional Errors: The Judge Versus the Layperson
Besides contextual factors, such as character evidence, empirical
research has also highlighted the existence of individual differences in the
propensity to commit the FAE.48  Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson49 put
forward the hypothesis that in trial settings judges are less likely to commit
the FAE than laypeople.  While their claim is restricted to the American
judiciary, the factors they identify to support their conclusion are widely
shared by European judiciaries.  In fact, their claim is based on the follow-
ing observations: i) Judges are routinely confronted with the task of mak-
41. FED. R. EVID. 403.
42. Mirjan R. Damas̆ka, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 70 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 55, 56 (1994); Stewart Field, State, Citizen, and Character in French Crimi-
nal Process, 33 J. LAW SOC., 522, 523– 24 (2006).
43. The present experiment was conducted with Italian subjects.  For this reason,
this section puts emphasis on the regulation of character evidence under Italian law.
44. Grossi, supra note 7, at 224.
45. See generally Michele Taruffo, Evidence Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 19– 39 (M. Cappelletti eds., vol. XVI, 2014).
46. TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE, supra note 10, at 345; Grossi, supra
note 7, at 224.
47. Grossi, supra note 7, at 224.
48. Bauman & Skitka, supra note 16, at 275.
49. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 12, at 355.
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ing attributions for human behavior.50  This factor, in their view, should
allow judges to test their consciously and unconsciously held beliefs on the
determinants of human behavior (dispositions vs. situational factors) and
thus bring judges toward a view of the world that is more attentive to the
power of situational factors.51  ii) Judges, because of their role, are expected
to make decisions that are fair, legitimate, and well-reasoned.52  This again
may bring them to look more carefully at situational cues to make sense of
the facts under scrutiny at trial.  iii) Judges’ attention to situational factors
might be enhanced by institutional mechanisms and procedures of the
trial.53  For instance, by debating in front of the court, trial parties may
highlight various contextual factors that might have influenced the conduct
under scrutiny.54  iv) Individuals that are more prone to understand the
complex influence of situational factors on human behavior may self-select
in the judiciary.55  This, in turn, may create an environment in the judici-
ary that further promotes situationist views.56  v) Situationism in the judi-
ciary is enhanced when adjudicators are provided with the time and
support (e.g., law clerks) to make their decisions.57  This support should
help them to undergo a more thorough deliberation of the facts under scru-
tiny at trial.  vi) Adjudicators are routinely confronted with opposing views
(those of the parties and other trial participants such as experts) on a sub-
ject matter.58  This diversity of encounters may help judges to learn how to
distinguish situational from personality-based determinants of human
behavior.  For instance, this may occur when subjects with very different
backgrounds act similarly in a certain situation, indicating that this behav-
ior is common among individuals who find themselves in that situation.59
vii) The accountability mechanisms (appeal review, publication of the
motivation, etc.) that surround the adjudication process foster situationist
views by pushing judges to think more thoroughly when making a deci-
sion.60  All of these factors are shared by European judges and trial sys-
tems.  The overall outcome of their analysis is that, at least in trial settings,
adjudicators are likely to hold a relatively more situationist view of human
behavior than the general population.61  However, this hypothesis is yet to
be tested.
Note that the hypothesis proposed by Benforado and Hanson is not
obvious.  Empirical research casts doubt on the effectiveness of some of the
mechanisms described above to promote situationism.  For instance, while
it is true that judges’ role, as well as the institutional environment in which
50. Id. at 349– 50.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 354– 56.
53. Id. at 356– 57.
54. Id.
55. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 12, at 360.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 361– 62.
58. Id. at 362, 364.
59. Id. at 364.
60. Id. at 364– 65.
61. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 12, at 348– 49.
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they operate, should motivate them to make accurate decisions, the feed-
back they receive on their performance is often rather limited.62  In addi-
tion, while it might be the case that individuals who tend to look for
complex explanations for human behavior self-select in the judiciary, this
is not the only relevant demographic variable.  For instance, high-status
people tend to explain life events more as a result of a person’s disposition
and reject restorative views of punishment, i.e., views that focus on crimi-
nal rehabilitation, than low-status people.63  Judges are a high-status group
both in the United States and in continental Europe.
Generally, research indicates that judges are only sometimes better
than laypeople at avoiding the making of biased trial decisions.64  While
there are some important exceptions to this trend,65 judges’ decisions are
often influenced by their political beliefs,66 identity,67 emotions,68 and
biases.69  The first important question, therefore, remains whether judges
are really less prone to make faulty attributions of responsibility at trial.
This work aims to provide an answer to this question.
A second question remaining is whether judges outperform laypeople
in applying rules that the legal system sets to reduce regarding the influ-
ence of the FAE on their own decisions.  As mentioned above, when it
comes to character evidence, European legal systems adopt looser regula-
tory safeguards against the FAE than those found in American evidence
law.  This institutional arrangement is often justified by the idea that
judges are able to correctly handle character evidence.70  In this view,
widely held by judges71 and scholars,72 judges are unbiased factfinders
62. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 (2007).
63. See Michael W. Kraus & Dacher Keltner, Social Class Rank, Essentialism, and
Punitive Judgment, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 258 (2013); Michael E.
Varnum et al., Social Class Differences in N400 Indicate Differences in Spontaneous Trait
Inference, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 518, 518– 19 (2012) (reviewing literature
that indicates social class differences in propensity to commit the FAE).
64. See generally Teichman & Zamir, supra note 14, at 693.
65. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable
Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 96 (2011).
66. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FED-
ERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 65 (2013).
67. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Let My People Go: Ethnic In-
Group Bias in Judicial Decisions— Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 403, 415– 17 (2010).
68. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head:
Do Judges Follow The Law Of Follow Their Feelings, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 862– 64 (2014).
69. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judici-
ary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1521– 22
(2009).
70. See Sheldon & Murray, supra note 8, at 227– 28.
71. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981); State v. Garcia, 397 P.2d 214,
216 (Ariz. 1964); Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179, 183 (Pa. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Glover, 405 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
72. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 13, at 63– 64; Grossi, supra, note 7, at 224;
Levin & Cohen, supra note 13, at 916.
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who are able to avoid cognitive errors arising from exposure to this type of
evidence.
Yet, does expertise in adjudication improve the ability to assign char-
acter evidence its legally prescribed probative value?  Existing research on
similar types of evidence provides mixed results.  A meta-analysis of stud-
ies conducted with laypeople indicates that evidence of prior convictions
has some impact on laypeople’s decisions in mock trials.73  A similar result
was obtained in a 2005 study conducted on 265 U.S. judges by Andrew
Wistrich and co-authors,74 who tested the judges’ propensity to use inad-
missible evidence in a series of civil and criminal cases.  In each case,
judges in the treatment group were presented with various forms of inad-
missible evidence.  Of particular relevance for the present work are the
third75 and fourth76 studies, which analyzed the effect of parties’ previous
conducts (tendency to sexual promiscuity and previous convictions) on
trial outcomes.  These studies find that judges are not able to disregard this
information.77  This holds true regardless of the years of experience of the
judge.78  However, while certainly informative, the study by Wistrich and
co-authors does not fully capture the dynamics underlying the functioning
of the FAE in relation to character evidence.  In the presence of character
evidence, the FAE may lead individuals to overestimate the probability that
a person’s conduct will be repeated in the future.  Going back to the exam-
ple above, evidence of previously badly-repaired houses could lead judges
to believe that Adam was negligent in repairing Brenda’s roof.  For this rea-
son, it is important that the previous conduct (presented with the evi-
dence) matches the one under scrutiny at trial.  In the study conducted by
Wistrich and co-authors,79 previous criminal convictions for fraud are
introduced in a tort trial to undermine the credibility of the plaintiff;80 in
the sexual promiscuity evidence scenario, this evidence was provided to
hint at the fact that the woman that was allegedly raped had in fact given
her consent to the alleged rapist.  Thus, in both scenarios, the evidence of
the previous conduct was only partially related to the one under scrutiny at
trial.  Our study differs from the one by Wistrich and co-authors in two
main ways.  First, we test the effect of previous convictions on the decisions
made in a case that presents very similar facts.81  This is the most suitable
way to test the FAE in relation to character evidence.  Second, we test the
European rule on character evidence, which contrary to American law,
73. For a meta-analysis of this literature see Dennis J. Devine & David E. Caughlin,
Do They Matter? A Meta-Analytic Investigation of Individual Characteristics and Guilt Judg-
ments, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 109, 116 (2014).
74. Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1259.
75. Id. at 1298– 1304.
76. Id. at 1304– 08.
77. Id. at 1259.
78. Id. at 1302, 1307.
79. Id. at 1300– 06.
80. Id. at 1305– 06.
81. See infra Part IV.C, discussing this more at length.
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does not require us to ignore character evidence, but only to assign it the
lowest probative value.
Another strand of literature that is relevant for the present study is the
one that, more generally, analyzes judges’ ability to disregard inadmissible
information.82  Landsman and Rakos test in a tort law scenario whether
judges and lay adjudicators differ in their ability to disregard evidence of
subsequent remedial measures.  This study found no differences between
the two groups.83  Similar findings were obtained in a more recent work by
Saul Wallace and Holly Kassin.84  Here, judges were not able to disregard
information obtained via coercion during an interrogation.  Again, this
result was not dependent on judges’ experience.  This study replicated with
judges a result that was obtained in an early analysis conducted with laype-
ople.85  When taken together, this research suggests that the two groups
(judges and laypeople) were similarly prone to use inadmissible evidence.
Against these findings, Chris Guthrie and co-authors did not find evidence
that American administrative judges are unable to ignore improperly
authenticated evidence in a hypothetical trial scenario.86  Similarly, a
recent study shows that judges, regardless of years of experience at the
bench, make similar decisions in hindsight and foresight when establish-
ing probable cause.87  This suggests that judges are not unduly influenced
by the hindsight information.  Overall, research on the effect of inadmissi-
ble evidence on experts’ decision-making indicates that judges are some-
times able to provide inadmissible evidence its due probative value.  Yet,
given the mixed findings of this literature, it is difficult to predict under
which conditions this occurs.
In this Article, we complement this literature by studying whether par-
ticipants in our experiment are able to correctly apply rules of evidence
adopted by several European legal systems to reduce the risk of errors in
the attribution of responsibility at trial.  In particular, we focus on eviden-
tiary rules prevailing in Italy, but that are common to other main civil law
traditions.88  In doing so, we set the basis for an empirically informed
debate on the relative performance of the American and the European legal
systems.
82. Teichman & Zamir, supra note 14, at 664, 671– 72 (2014) (reviewing this
literature).
83. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
113, 125 (1994).
84. See Brian D. Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error Analysis: How Do Judges
Respond To Confession Errors?, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 156 (2012).
85. See Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experi-
mental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997).
86. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 69, at 1516– 17.
87. See Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 65, at 96.
88. See, e.g., Damas̆ka, supra note 42, at 55; Field, supra note 42, at 523– 24.
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IV. The Experiment
A. Participants
Most of the existing studies on expertise in adjudication have been
conducted with judges that had, on average, substantial experience (i.e.,
more than ten years) of serving at the bench.89  In addition, studies on
expertise and decision-making often compare experts with subjects that
have no experience whatsoever in performing tasks tested in the experi-
ment.90  Comparing senior experts with individuals that have no experi-
ence in performing adjudication tasks is certainly a meaningful enterprise
to spot differences among the two groups.  However, this clear-cut distinc-
tion captures only one part of reality.  Nowadays most Western legal sys-
tems employ a large number of non-professional judges that serve the
bench for very limited periods of time and that often have broad jurisdic-
tion in civil and criminal cases.91  The selection criteria and appointment
status vary from legal system to legal system as well as across different sub-
categories of non-professional judges.  For example, in Italy, more than
3700 honorary judges (vis-a-vis 6485 professional judges) routinely carry
out judicial activities both in criminal and civil law trials.  Italian honorary
judges are nominated for a limited period of time (three or four years,
renewable only once) and are chosen among individuals that have some
degree of familiarity with the law (depending on the type of honorary
judge, either a standard law degree or having passed the bar exam).92  Sim-
ilarly, non-professional judges play a major role in the justice system of
several EU countries.93  In addition, the use of non-professional judges is
not confined only to the European experience.  For instance, U.S. justice
courts employ a large number of non-professional judges with functions
that vary from state to state.94  In this connection, it can be interesting to
89. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 69, at 1492; Rachlinski, Guthrie,
& Wistrich, supra note 65, at 77; Wallace & Kassin, supra note 84, at 153; Wistrich,
Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1218.
90. See, e.g., Ian K. Belton, Mary Thomson & Mandeep K. Dhami, Lawyer and Non-
lawyer Susceptibility to Framing Effects in Out-of-Court Civil Litigation Settlement, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD 578, 587 (2014).
91. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, STUDY ON THE FUNC-
TIONING OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS IN THE EU MEMBER STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES FROM THE
CEPEJ QUESTIONNAIRES 2010-2012-2013-2014-2015-2016, at 4 (2018).
92. See Silvia Ciotti Galetti, The Italian Court Honorary Judges, in POLICING IN CEN-
TRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 443, 444
(Gorazd Mes̆ko, Milan Pagon, Bojan Dobovs̆ek eds., 2004).
93. See generally Eric Dubois, Christel Schurrer & Marco Velicogna, The Functioning
of Judicial Systems and the Situation of the Economy in the European Union Member States,
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (DIRECTORATE GENERAL JUSTICE) (2013)
(reviewing the use of non-professional judges in various European countries).
94. See, e.g., Susan L. Patnode, Julie A. Davies & Lisa A. Frisch, Behind the Scenery, A
Rural New York Portrait, in Rural Justice in New York State— Challenges and Recommenda-
tions, 17 GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J. 1, 6 (2017) (discussing the employment of justices in New
York that do not have a law degree).  Note also that many professional judges in the US
have little prior experience in practicing law.  For instance, in 2014, 45.4% of U.S. cir-
cuit court judges had no prior experience as a judge before their appointment to a cir-
cuit court.  Among those that had no prior experience as judges, about 20% had no
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expand the inquiry of the influence of cognitive errors in adjudication to
samples of subjects that have only a limited experience in adjudication, as
this can shed new light on the decision-making of judges that have served
only for a relatively short period of time (e.g., judges in their early career
and non-professional judges).
To fill this gap, we recruited two independent samples of subjects.  The
first was composed of one hundred individuals (male = 35%; average age =
25.9; standard deviation (SD) = 1.22) enrolled in a Scuola di Specializza-
zione per le Professioni Legali (SSPL).  SSPLs are two-year post JD schools
that prepare law graduates to become Italian magistrates.  Sixty of the SSPL
participants were enrolled in the second year of the SSPL, while the remain-
ing were enrolled in the first year.  We collected data on first-year and sec-
ond-year SSPL participants on two different days.  We are therefore able to
distinguish the answers provided by the two groups.  Attendance of a SSPL
provides direct access to the competitive public exam to access the judicial
career.  Nowadays, SSPLs are the main route via which magistrates are
recruited in Italy.95  Participation was incentivized through the offer of a
buffet and a lottery with a 100-euro prize (about 117 USD).
To make sure that subjects in our sample were attending the school to
subsequently join the judiciary, we asked participants after completion of
the experiment whether they intended to enter the judiciary.  Out of the
100 participants, 94 replied that they desired to enter the judiciary after
the completion of the school.  This sample is therefore composed of sub-
jects who are very close to completing the education necessary to qualify
for the exam to enter the Italian judiciary and that, at the time of the exper-
iment, were to a large extent still motivated to pursue a judicial career.  For
this reason, we refer to them as to “judges-to-be.”
The second group was composed of 129 university students (male =
32,56%; average age = 21,2; SD = 2.28) enrolled in a law school (both at the
graduate and undergraduate level, as Italian law schools are not divided
into bachelor and master).  No incentive was provided for participation.
They were recruited in university libraries of the same city in which the
SSPL is located.  Subjects were selected with these criteria to provide some
basic control for educational background and geographical location.
We compare the decision-making skills of judges-to-be with those of
law students to test the hypothesis put forward by Benforado and Han-
son.96  If it is the case that individuals that decide to enter the judiciary
tend on average to be more situationist than the rest of the population, we
can expect subjects who embark on a judicial career after law school to be
less dispositionist (i.e., tend less to commit the FAE), than the average law
experience as lawyers in private practice. Barry J. McMillion, U.S. Circuit Court Judges:
Profile of Professional Experiences Prior to Appointment, CRS REPORT 1, 5 (2014).
95. See Giuseppe Di Federico, Recruitment, Professional Evaluation, Career and Disci-
pline of Judges and Prosecutors in Italy, in RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION AND
CAREER OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN EUROPE: AUSTRIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN 128 (Giuseppe Di Federico ed., 2005).
96. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 12, at 360.
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student.  This is for two reasons: i) there is no reason to believe that the
average law student should be less situationist than the general population,
thus a comparison with law students also provides information about the
comparison with the general population; ii) unless one believes that law-
yers, in general, are a category that sparks situationism in society as much
as lawyers that aim to enter in the judiciary, we should observe a certain
degree of self-selection among law students.  For this reason, a meaningful
comparison can be made between post-JDs that self-select in a judicial
career and other law students.
We controlled whether our samples differed in terms of age and gen-
der composition.  We found no differences in terms of gender, and (not
surprisingly) we found that judges-to-be were significantly older than law
students.  Note that the major difference between the educational curricula
at a law school and an SSPL is that the former has an almost exclusive
focus on learning positive law and legal reasoning.  Conversely, the SSPL
training has a stronger practical focus, which integrates theoretical learn-
ing with internships in courts and various practical courses (case law read-
ing and drafting, legal counselling, mock trials, etc.).
B. Design
We used a 2 × 2 quasi-experimental design.  Our independent vari-
ables were participant type (judges-to-be vs. law students) and character
evidence (character evidence vs. non-character evidence).  Respondents in
each group were randomly assigned to one of the conditions (character
evidence vs. non-character evidence).
C. Stimuli and Measures
All respondents were given a questionnaire divided into two parts.  In
the first part, we tested participants’ personal tendencies to commit the
FAE.  To do so, we used the standard questionnaire on implicit theories of
moral character.97
Research indicates that a predictor of individual variations in the ten-
dency to commit this error are implicit (or lay) theories.98  Lay theories are
not scientific theories nor are they necessarily consciously held.  Yet, indi-
viduals often use them in an unconscious way to understand their own
behavior and that of others.99  Implicit theories are categorized as tending
either more towards situationism or to dispositionism.100  The more the
implicit theory is situationist, the more it tends to explain human behavior
97. See Carol S. Dweck, Chi-yue Chiu &Ying-yi Hong, Implicit Theories and Their
Role in Judgments and Reactions: A World from Two Perspectives, 6 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 267,
269 (1995).
98. See Choi, Nisbett & Norenzayan, supra note 16, at 47; Bauman & Skitka, supra
note 16, at 271, 276; Carol S. Dweck, Implicit Theories, in HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 52 (Paul A. M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins
eds., SAGE Publications Ltd., vol. 2, 2012).
99. See Dweck, Chiu & Hong, supra note 97, at 268– 69.
100. See Id.
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in terms of situational, contextual factors.  Conversely, the less it is situa-
tionist (i.e., the more it is dispositionist), the more it stresses the role of
personality.  Individuals holding a dispositionist lay theory are more
inclined to commit the FAE than people adhering to situationist beliefs.101
Within the lay theories strand of research, studies on implicit theories
of moral character are particularly relevant for the study of attributions in
trial settings.102  Based on implicit theories of moral character, individuals
can be categorized as either entity theorists or incremental theorists.103
Entity theorists have a relatively higher propensity to believe that moral
traits are non-malleable.104  Entity theorists are therefore more prone to
commit the FAE than incremental theorists.105  In mock trials, for example,
adherence to an entity theory of moral character has shown to predict a
higher use of character evidence to establish guilt.106  In a similar vein,
Tam and co-authors found that entity theorists tend to hold stronger beliefs
in criminal recidivism, dispositionally driven crime, and, as a result,
impose higher punishments.107  Furthermore, Tam and co-authors also
found that higher punishments imposed by entity theorists were mediated
by dispositionally oriented attributions.108
The questionnaire on implicit theories of moral character was trans-
lated into Italian with the support of a professional translator (see the
Appendix for the English version).  The questionnaire is composed of the
following three items: 1) “A person’s moral character is something very
basic about them, and it can’t be changed much.”; 2) “Whether a person is
responsible or sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their personality.  It
cannot be changed very much.”; 3) “There is not much that can be done to
change a person’s moral traits (e.g., conscientiousness, uprightness, and
honesty).”  Subjects were requested to express their agreement with each of
the three statements on a 1 to 6-point scale and the answers were then
combined in a scale to form a measure of implicit beliefs of moral charac-
ter.  The higher the score on this scale, the more the respondent can be
seen as an entity theorist (i.e., has a higher tendency to commit the FAE).
We observe that the scale had an excellent internal consistency
(Cronbach’s a = .84).
101. See Choi, Nisbett & Norenzayan, supra note 16, at 47; Bauman & Skitka, supra
note 16, at 271, 276; Dweck, supra note 98, at 52.
102. See Chiu, C.Y., et al., Implicit Theories and Conceptions of Morality, 73 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 923, 936 (1997).
103. See id. at 923.
104. See id. at 937.
105. See Dweck, supra note 98, at 53; David H. Silveran, Stein-Kjetil Moe & Pål Iver-
sen, The Association Between Implicit Theories of Personality and the Attribution Process,
41 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 107, 110 (2000).
106. See Benjamin M. Gervey et al., Differential Use of Person Information in Decisions
about Guilt Versus Innocence: The Role of Implicit Theories, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 17, 26 (1999).
107. See Kim-Pong Tam et al., Belief about Immutability of Moral Characters and Puni-
tiveness Toward Criminal Offenders, 43 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 608 (2013).
108. See id. at 608.
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In the second part of the questionnaire, which contained the character
evidence vs. non-character evidence treatment, respondents read a hypo-
thetical tort law case in which a self-employed bricklayer was asked by a
client to repair the roof of his house.  Twelve years after the reparation took
place, a violent whirlwind hit the roof, hereby damaging it.  The client sued
the bricklayer arguing that the damage would not have occurred had the
bricklayer used due care to repair the roof.  The bricklayer, however, denied
not having taken due care.  It was explained that evidence at trial showed
that it was more than one hundred years ago that a whirlwind hit that area.
In addition, the expert report established that it is possible for a badly
repaired roof to last twelve years, but the expert was not able to establish
whether the bricklayer exercised due care when repairing the roof.  Impor-
tant to note is that the strong and unforeseeable whirlwind was mentioned
in the scenario to introduce a situational factor that could explain the acci-
dent.  Respondents in the character evidence condition, in addition,
received the information that on two previous occasions the bricklayer was
found liable for having negligently repaired a roof.  On both occasions, the
bricklayer was said to have denied responsibility and to have shown little
consideration for the loss of his clients.  This is the typical situation in
which, under Italian law, judges are expected to ignore character evi-
dence.109  In fact, given the low probative value attached to items of charac-
ter evidence and the absence of other items of evidence against the
plaintiff, the judge is expected to ignore this evidence.110  Participants in
the no character evidence condition did not receive the information.
Thus, the second part of the questionnaire tests whether subjects are
able to give character evidence its legally prescribed probative value and
therefore correctly apply evidence rules that aim to limit attributional
errors at trial.  Note that given the specific features of this case, respon-
dents have a relatively simple rule to follow (i.e., ignore character evi-
dence).  Thus, if they fail to correctly apply this rule in this occasion, it is
plausible that they would not follow it in situations where the rule is less
clear-cut, such as when they are called to give some weight to the item of
evidence presented.
The dependent variables in each condition were the following: 1) we
assessed respondents’ attribution of the incident to situation vs. person by
asking them to identify the cause/s of the accident on a 1-7 point scale (1,
the sole cause of the accident was the violent whirlwind –  7, the sole cause
of the accident was the conduct of the bricklayer); 2) participants were
asked to imagine that they were judges presiding a case and to assign
responsibility to the bricklayer for the accident.  The answer had to be
given on a 1-7 point scale (1, the bricklayer is not responsible at all –  7, the
bricklayer is fully responsible)— this is our key dependent variable that
tests the attribution of legal responsibility to the defendant; 3) we con-
109. See Grossi, supra note 7, at 224.
110. See id. at 224– 25.
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cluded the questionnaire by asking participants which percentage of the
damages had to be compensated by the bricklayer.
We expected that respondents who received character evidence attri-
bute more causality and responsibility to the plaintiff and require him to
compensate a larger percentage of the harm compared to subjects who did
not receive character evidence.  Given the mixed findings of previous
research on the relative performance of judges and laypeople in using inad-
missible information,111 we expect judges-to-be to be less affected by char-
acter evidence than law students.  Building on previous research on
implicit theories of moral character and trial decisions,112 we expect that
respondents’ score on the implicit theories dimension predicts the attribu-
tion of causality, responsibility, and damages awards.
V. Results
Before testing our hypotheses, following the procedure described by
Dweck and co-authors, we computed the proportion of entity and incre-
mental theorists in both samples.113  We found that, respectively, 48% and
49% of the judges-to-be and law students are incremental theorists.  This
finding is in line with the general results according to which approximately
50% of the American participants are classified as incremental theo-
rists.114  This indicates that judges-to-be have the same propensity to com-
mit the FAE as participants of previous studies conducted in the United
States.  In line with previous literature on implicit theories, the remainder
of the analysis used the implicit theories of moral character as a scale
variable.115
General Linear Models were used to estimate the effect of the indepen-
dent variables (participant type, character evidence, and implicit theories)
on the dependent variables.
A. Manipulation Check
To verify whether our manipulation was successful, we asked partici-
pants on a 7-point Likert scale to what degree they believed that the defen-
dant had a history of not repairing roofs properly (1, not at all –  7, very
much).  A General Linear Model with both our manipulation (character
evidence and training) standardized scores on the implicit theories scale
and their interaction as predictors revealed only a main effect for treatment,
F(1, 222) = 172.50, p < .001, h2 = .44, indicating that participants in the
character evidence condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.38) were more inclined to
believe that the defendant had a history of not repairing roofs properly
than participants in the no character evidence condition (M = 2.65, SD =
1.49).  This indicated our manipulation was successful.
111. See Teichman & Zamir, supra note 14, at 671– 73.
112. See Gervey et al., supra note 106, at 26; Tam et al., supra note 107, at 608.
113. See Dweck, Chiu & Hong, supra note 97, at 269.
114. See Silveran, Moe & Iversen, supra note 105, at 110.
115. See Dweck, Chiu & Hong, supra note 97, at 269.
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B. Attribution of Causality
The same analysis as for the manipulation check was conducted for
the dependent variable attribution of causality.  Results revealed a main
effect for character evidence, F(1, 222) = 8.27, p < .005, h2 = .04, indicating
that participants in the character evidence condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.16)
were more inclined to attribute the incident to the defendant’s conduct (or
less inclined to attribute to the situation) than participants in the no char-
acter evidence condition (M = 2.63, SD = 1.15).  This analysis also reveals a
significant main effect of type of participant, F(1, 222) = 8.15, p = .005, h2
= .04, indicating that law students (M = 3.05, SD = 1.17) were more
inclined to attribute the incident to the defendant’s conduct (or less
inclined to attribute to the situation) than judges-to-be (M = 2.61, SD =
1.14).  The analysis revealed no other effects, except for a marginally signif-
icant main effect of implicit theories, F(1, 222) = 2.67, p = .10, h2 = .01,
indicating that the more participants are dispositionally inclined to attri-
bute to dispositions, the more they did attribute the accident to the defen-
dant’s conduct.  This effect, as well as the one relative to character
evidence, did not differ between first- and second-year judges-to be.
Table 1: Mean Response (Causality, Responsibility, and Damages
Award) by Condition and Total
Judges-To-Be Law Students
Non- Non-
Evidence Type Character Character Total Character Character Total
Causality 2.82 2.41 2.61 3.34 2.80 3.06
Responsibility 2.57 2.27 2.42 3.48 2.64 3.06
Damages Award 21.94 18.24 20.05 32.54 22.89 27.32
C. Responsibility
We repeated the analysis for the responsibility variable and observed a
main effect for character evidence, F(1, 222) = 9.07, p < .005, h2 = .04,
suggesting that subjects in the character evidence condition (M = 3.08, SD
= 1.45) had a tendency to judge the defendant to be more responsible than
participants in the non-character evidence condition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.32).
We also found a significant main effect of type of participant, F(1, 222) =
12.00, p = .001, h2 = .05, suggesting that judges-to-be (M = 2.42, SD = 1.34)
were less inclined to assign responsibility to the defendant than law stu-
dents (M = 3.05, SD = 1.42).  These main effects were, however, qualified
by a marginally significant interaction, F(1, 222) = 2.69, p = .10, h2 = .01.
Closer inspection (pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments)
showed that whereas law students receiving character evidence did assign
more responsibility (M = 3.45, SD = 1.35) than law students who did not
receive character evidence (M = 2.64, SD = 1.37), for judges-to-be this was
not the case: respondents who received character evidence did not assign
significantly more responsibility to the defendant (M = 2.57, SD = 1.43)
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than respondents who did not receive character evidence (M = 2.42, SD =
1.33).  We also find a significant, yet marginal, main effect of implicit theo-
ries, F (1, 222) = 3.36, p < .10, h2 = .01, indicating the existence of a posi-
tive correlation between dispositionism and the attribution of
responsibility.  As above, a more fine-grained analysis showed that the
effect of character evidence and implicit theories was not different between
the first- and second-year judges-to-be.
D. Percentage of Damages Awarded
Lastly, the same analysis was conducted with the percentage of dam-
ages awarded as the dependent variable.  Since a finding of responsibility is
a precondition for requiring the defendant to compensate losses, we
excluded from the sample the subjects that did not assign responsibility to
the defendant (i.e., we took into account only those that answered the
responsibility question with a number > 1).  We find no significant main
effect of treatment.  In addition, the analysis also reveals the absence of a
significant main effect of implicit theories.
VI. Discussion
Are judges less prone to commit the FAE in trial settings than laype-
ople?  Since both the type of evidence presented at trial and personal incli-
nations can trigger the FAE, answering this question requires looking at
each of these factors.
First, our data show that judges-to-be score similarly to law students
on the implicit theories of moral character.  Therefore, the hypothesis put
forward by Benforado and Hanson,116 according to which people that
embark on a judicial career tend to be more situationist than the rest of the
population, is not supported by the data.  Second, we find that for both
groups (law students and judges-to-be) higher adherence to dispositionism
is (marginally) associated with higher attribution of causality and respon-
sibility to the plaintiff.  In this connection, when read in conjunction with
the studies on implicit theories, FAE and punishment,117 our result sug-
gests that in the present study entity theorists may have attributed higher
responsibility and damages because of a failure to correct their disposi-
tional inferences for situational factors.
This result is consistent with previous studies which find that, like
laypeople, judges rely on cognitive processes that trigger the FAE.  For
instance, American and Dutch judges have been found to rely on anchor-
ing and adjustment,118 which is one of the mental processes that give rise
116. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 12, at 348– 49.
117. Tam et al., supra note 107, at 608.
118. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make Relia-
ble Numeric Judgments: Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695,
730– 31 (2015).
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to the FAE.119  Feldman and co-authors find similar results with law stu-
dents and experienced lawyers.120  Our findings thus suggest that neither
the training received by judges-to-be nor self-selection in the profession
shields them fully from committing attributional errors in trial settings.  In
Part VIII, we elaborate on various debiasing strategies that could be
adopted to improve the decision-making of judges and jurors.
In relation to the effect of character evidence on trial outcomes our
results show that, contrary to law students, judges-to-be were better able to
correctly apply the rule that limits the probative value of character evidence
when expected to do so.  This result holds true for the responsibility varia-
ble, but not for the causality variable.  This difference in results can be
explained by the fact that, under Italian law, attributing fault is a legal
endeavour, while establishing causality is not necessarily so.  To explain,
the Italian legal system, as many other legal systems, distinguishes the
notion of causality, i.e., the factual relation between two events, from the
one of causation, i.e., a legal concept subject to various rules, such as the
requirement that a factor is a “necessary” cause of an accident.121  Our
questionnaire asked participants to determine causality, not causation.
Also, in the questionnaire, we stressed the legal relevance of the responsi-
bility question by asking participants to imagine that they were judges pre-
siding over a case.  This framing was instead not present in the causality
question.122  In line with previous research,123 this finding suggests that
judges-to-be perform better than law students when making legal deci-
sions, but not when they are merely asked to attribute causality for events.
The result is consistent with the literature on the effect of character
evidence on lay adjudicators, which shows that laypeople’s trial decisions
are affected by knowledge of prior convictions.124  In addition, this result
is also consistent with the evidence indicating that American administra-
tive law judges are able to disregard inadmissible information.125  Simi-
larly, this study is in line with the recent finding by Rachlinski and co-
authors that judges, regardless of years of experience in adjudication, are
able to disregard hindsight information when expected to do so.126  Our
results suggest that the employment of judges may reduce the influence of
the FAE on trial outcomes, at least when this error is due to character evi-
dence.  What can explain this result?  Given that we found no differences
in terms of implicit theories among the two groups, which excludes self-
119. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41, 123 (1980).
120. Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr & Doron Teichman, Anchoring Legal Standards, 13
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 298, 320 (2016).
121. For a review, see Marta Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni, The European Ways to
Causation, in CAUSATION IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 85, 94– 95 (Marta Infantino & Eleni
Zervogianni eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017).
122. See the Appendix, infra, for the entire questionnaire.
123. See Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 65, at 92.
124. Devine & Caughlin, supra note 73, at 116.
125. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 69, at 1516– 17.
126. See Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 65, at 92.
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selection as an explanation, it is plausible that our results were due to dif-
ferences in familiarity with handling cases at trial between law students
and judges-to-be.  Indeed, it is plausible that, because of their greater expe-
rience, judges-to-be perform better than law students in correctly applying
rules limiting the probative value of character evidence.127
These results are surprising.  Indeed, they are somewhat difficult to
reconcile with part of the previous literature that finds that even profes-
sional judges with many years of professional experience are not always
able to handle inadmissible evidence as expected.128  Yet, a common find-
ing in this literature is that, when it comes to ignoring inadmissible evi-
dence, the years of experience in the judiciary are irrelevant in predicting
performance.129  It can, therefore, be the case that there are types of evi-
dence that are easy to ignore after having received little training in adjudi-
cation; while others are very difficult to ignore, regardless of experience.
Yet, on the basis of current data, it is difficult to identify which types of
character evidence are more easily ignored.  Further research is needed in
this direction.  If little expertise is sufficient to ignore some types of charac-
ter evidence but not others, one could conceive tailoring evidence law
based on the specific type of evidence considered.
Our findings contribute to the transatlantic debate on the relative
advantages of American evidence law and continental Europe evidence law
in improving the accuracy of trial decisions.  In particular, they indicate
that even a softer regulation of character evidence than the one adopted
under American law may sometimes be effective in steering adjudicators’
decisions in the right direction.  Furthermore, as discussed above, Italian
law does not totally forbid the use of character evidence, but it requires the
judge to ignore it when it is the only item of evidence available.  Judges-to-
be have shown to be able to act upon this prescription, at least when
assigning responsibility.  Overall, these findings offer some support to the
idea, often held in legal scholarship, that a ban on character evidence
might not always be necessary in legal systems that employ judges.130
Thus, the institutional setups put forward by legal systems on the two sides
of the Atlantic seem to be well calibrated.131  The almost exclusive employ-
ment of (professional and non-professional) judges in European countries
may justify soft regulation of character evidence, but similar rules may not
be warranted when decisions are made by jurors.
127. On the role of experience in improving judicial decision-making see Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 69, at 1483– 86.
128. Wallace & Kassin, supra note 84, at 156; Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra
note 13, at 1259.
129. Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 65, at 87; Wallace & Kassin, supra
note 84, at 153; Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1302, 1307.
130. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 13, at 64; Levin & Cohen, supra note 13, at
916; Sheldon & Murray, supra note 8, at 227– 28.
131. Note that European countries may gain from admitting character evidence at
trial because this type of evidence can have some probative value.  Thus, if well used, it
can improve the accuracy of trial decision. See Sheldon & Murray, supra note 8, at 228.
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VII. Limitations
Despite our efforts, the present work has various limitations.  A first
limitation, common to all vignette experiments, is that the behavioural
responses of our subjects were given in a hypothetical scenario.  This meth-
odology does not replicate the emotional and institutional incentives that
factfinders receive in real life settings, and therefore our results have only a
limited external validity.  Yet, isolating the effects of the FAE on judicial
decision-making is already a challenging task in artificial settings.  Study-
ing this phenomenon in the field would be even more difficult.
Second, our subjects were law students and judges-to-be that were
approached in the same city.  Despite the fact that the two groups are simi-
lar on many levels, they were different to each other regarding the training
they had received and their professional aspirations.  That being said, it is
possible that our result was driven by another demographic factor.  In this
connection, a clear difference between the two samples was age.  In line
with academic practice, we, therefore, conduced our analysis controlling
for age.  Our results were replicated.  We also controlled our results for
gender and obtained results in line with the previous research.
VIII. Implications for the Court System
This study indicates that, as laypeople, judges who have a propensity
to commit attributional errors are likely to commit them in trial settings as
well.  What can be done about this?  There is not a simple answer to this
question.  However, the large psychological literature on the FAE offers
some guidance.  Building on this literature we discuss some strategies that
policymakers, judges, and jurors can take to reduce attributional errors in
trial decisions.
A. Make Judges and Jurors Count
Evidence indicates that accountability can reduce the tendency to
infer dispositional traits from observed behaviors.132  In particular, a study
shows that accountability induces individuals “to process social informa-
tion in more analytic and complex ways, and that can check judgmental
biases such as . . . the fundamental attribution error.”133  Making judges
and jurors accountable for their decisions, for instance, by strengthening
the power of appellate courts to revise decisions made by lower courts may
thus reduce attributional errors.  In countries that limit the type of cases
that can go to appeal,134 this could be done, for instance, by broadening
132. See Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check of the Fundamental Attribu-
tion Error, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 233 (1985).
133. Id. at 233.
134. This happens, for instance, in the Supreme Court of the United States, where
only a fraction of the cases appealed are decided. See The Last Word: Courts of Appeals
Cases You Should Know, US COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/
educational-activities/last-word-courts-appeals-cases-you-should-know [https://
perma.cc/CN62-QXPR] (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).
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the scope of the cases that can be appealed.  Another strategy to implement
could be to require judges to motivate their decisions more thoroughly,
thus increasing the scrutiny of the public and of higher courts (in case of
an appeal), on the thoughts that lead to a decision.
B. Discussing in the Courtroom
Empirical literature shows that group discussion reduces peoples’ ten-
dency to make dispositionally oriented attributions.135  It is possible that
making judges and juries discuss factual aspects of the case before the
decision is made reduces the influence of the FAE on trial outcomes.136
Jury trials and collegial court proceedings already allow and encourage
such discussions, and, as such, the risk of attributional errors is likely
higher when decisions are made by monocratic courts.  In several Euro-
pean legal systems monocratic courts are quite diffuse, posing a risk of
attributional errors in trial settings.137  The widespread employment of
juries can be a comparative advantage for the American legal system over
continental Europe ones.
Nonetheless, trials by judges may offer a layer of safeguard against
inaccurate attributions that tend not to be present in trials by juries—
namely, the power of judges to actively participate in the discussion at
trial.  This power is granted to judges in many legal systems in continental
Europe.138  For instance, Italian law allows judges both to summon/
examine parties and order fact-finding procedures.139  When these powers
are granted, judges’ participation in trials tends to be less passive than that
of jurors in jury systems.140  It can be that systems that allow and incen-
tivize judges to take an active part in hearings may reduce the effect of the
FAE on trial outcomes.  This would occur regardless of whether the court is
monocratic or collegial.  A possible strategy against the FAE would be to
widen or incentivize the scope for active participation of judges (and
maybe juries) in trial discussions.
C. Writing in Third Person
Recent studies on the FAE show that self-distancing can reduce the
135. Edward F. Wright, C. A. Elizabeth Lüüs & Scott D. Christie, Does Group Discus-
sion Facilitate the Use of Consensus Information in Making Causal Attributions?, 59 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 261, 268 (1990); Edward F. Wright & Gary L. Wells, Does
Group Discussion Attenuate the Dispositional Bias?, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 542
(1985).
136. See Wright & Wells, supra note 135, at 544.
137. See, e.g., ANDREA LUGO, MANUALE DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 69– 70 (Claudio
De Angelis ed., 18th ed. 2012); Löıc Cadiet, Introduction to French Civil Justice System
and Civil Procedural Law, 28 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 331, 333– 34 (2011) (Japan).
138. On differences between the U.S. legal system and continental European legal
systems in terms of the power of the judge to intervene at trial, see Grossi, supra note 7,
at 214– 15. See generally John A. Jolowicz, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Civil
Procedure, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 281 (2003).
139. FRANCESCO P. LUISO, DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE: IL PROCESSO DI COGNIZIONE 95-
96 and 165-166 (9th ed., vol. 2, Giuffré Editore, 2017).
140. See Grossi, supra note 7, at 215.
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human tendency to make dispositionally oriented attributions.141  In this
literature, self-distancing is defined as “the process of taking a step back
from one’s own thoughts and looking at one’s thoughts and experiences as
if one were another.”142  Thus, according to these studies, when an
observer is called to judge the behavior of a third party, the more the for-
mer takes a step back to distance himself from his own thoughts, the less
his judgment will tend to be dispositionally oriented.143
Research indicates that a way to implement self-distancing that
reduces the tendency to make dispositionally oriented judgments is writing
in third person.144  In the context of a trial, judges could write their deci-
sions using the formula “the court” instead of “I.”
In this respect, there can be important differences between legal tradi-
tions.  In several European legal systems, judges write their decisions refer-
ring to themselves with expressions such as “the court.”145  The U.S.
practice tends instead to be more informal, allowing the use of the first
person.146  It is possible that this informal writing style facilitates the com-
mission of attributional errors at trial, and there might be a reason to limit
its use.147
We stress that while these three sets of policies could help to reduce
unwarranted errors in the courtroom, adopting them may not necessarily
be the best policy option for a least two reasons.  First, empirical evidence
indicates solely that accountability, group discussion, and self-distancing
induce individuals to make less dispositionally oriented judgments, but it
does not show that these judgments are accurate.  There is still a risk that
the attributional error is overcorrected or under-corrected.
Second, it is important to stress that these policies may also entail
costs that may not justify their adoption, despite their potential benefits.
For instance, increasing accountability, by widening the scope of appellate
revision or asking judges to write longer decisions, may make trials longer
and increase the administrative costs of proceedings.  Similarly, the choice
141. Ryan H. Bremner, Self Distancing and Human Reflection: Overcoming Bias in
Judgment and Emotional Reasoning 26 (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Michigan),
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/99872/brem-
ner_1.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/SE5J-HY3S].
142. Id. at 3.
143. See, e.g., id. at 10.
144. See id. at 26.
145. With regards to decisions of the Corte di Cassazione (the Italian Supreme Court)
see, for example, CORTE SUPREMA DI CASSAZIONE, http://www.cortedicassazione.it [https:/
/perma.cc/7DT7-54HX] (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).  With regards to the decisions of
Cour de Cassation (the French Supreme Court) see COUR DE CASSATION, http://
www.courdecassation.fr [https://perma.cc/LF5V-KRDB] (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).
146. Note the use of “I hold” and “I find” in opinions of various US courts. US Case
Law, JUSTIA US LAW, https://law.justia.com/cases/ [https://perma.cc/2RYE-QAGH]
(last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
147. Of course, the choice of the best writing style in judicial decision making may
entail taking into account a wider set of considerations than the possibility of commit-
ting attributional errors alone, and thus there is not necessarily a clear case to adopt
formal writing in courts.  On judicial writing style, see generally Richard A. Posner,
Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (1995).
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of the best writing style in judicial decision making may entail accounting
for a wider set of considerations than the possibility to commit attribu-
tional errors alone, and thus there is not necessarily a clear case to adopt
formal writing in courts.  Thus, countries need to balance different inter-
ests in addressing faulty attributions at trial, and this balancing may well
indicate that the best policy option is to not address faulty attributions.
Further research is therefore needed before these policies are implemented.
Conclusion
Attributing fault is a key but challenging aspect of tort trials.  A wealth
of psychological research shows that humans are prone to make systematic
errors in performing this task.  Is there a remedy for this problem?  Legal
systems in the United States and continental Europe adopt diametrically
opposed remedies to address this issue.  European legal systems rely
almost exclusively on judges to perform fact-finding, assuming that they
make fewer mistakes than laypeople in attributing responsibility at trial.
Under American law, instead, fact-finding is delegated to jurors, but some
types of evidence are made inadmissible in trials to protect jurors from
potentially biasing information, such as character evidence.  Legal scholars
debate on which of these two systems is better at reducing errors in fact-
finding.
In this Article, we provide empirical evidence on the relative perform-
ance of these two systems via a vignette study.  Our findings indicate that,
while the European approach to character evidence is not effective in
preventing laypeople (i.e., jurors) from committing errors in the attribution
of responsibility at trial, European rules are effective when fact-finding is
performed by judges.  Therefore, the American evidence law’s approach to
limit the admissibility of character evidence at trial seems appropriate
when fact-finding is performed by jurors.  However, our results also indi-
cate that neither of the two approaches can fully prevent factfinders’ errors
in attributing responsibility.  In particular, we find that when these errors
are due to unconscious beliefs held by factfinders, both judges’ and jurors’
decisions reflect the propensity of the factfinder to commit errors at trial.
We, therefore, conclude by proposing a number of policies that could
reduce errors in the attribution of fault in the courtroom.
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Appendix: Materials
This appendix presents the text of the hypothetical case that we report in
this article.  Variations present in each condition are labelled.  The demo-







You are being asked to participate in a study about decision making.
You will read statements and will be asked to answer questions related to
these statements.  Subsequently, you will read a case and then you will be
asked to answer questions related to the case.
All responses are anonymous.  In accordance with privacy law (Decreto
Legislativo n. 196/2003), the data gathered in this study will be analysed
and used only in an aggregate form and only for scientific purposes.
Turn the page to start the study.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\52-2\cin201.txt unknown Seq: 29  1-APR-20 13:43
2019 Judges Versus Jurors 263
Please read the following statements and answer the questions on a 1 to
6 degree scale (1 strongly disagree –  6 strongly agree).  Please provide
your answer by circling a number:
1) A person’s moral character is something very basic about them, and it
can’t be changed much.
Strongly disagree 1------2------3------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree
2) Whether a person is responsible or sincere or not is deeply ingrained in
their personality.  It cannot be changed very much.
Strongly disagree  1------2------3------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree
3) There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits
(e.g., conscientiousness, uprightness, and honesty).
Strongly disagree  1------2------3------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree
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Please read the following story very carefully before you answer the
questions
Mr X is a self-employed bricklayer who works as an independent contractor
specialized in the restoration of house roofs.
• Character evidence condition: On two occasions, two of the roofs
that Mr X has repaired collapse around 15 years after the repara-
tion took place.  The accident causes substantial losses to Mr X’s
clients.  Mr X’s clients complain and claim that Mr X has not taken
the appropriate amount of care when repairing the roof thus put-
ting their lives and properties at risk.  On both occasions, Mr X
denies not having done his work properly and replies to his clients
that he does not care about their health or property, that it is prob-
ably their fault and that he will not pay any damages.  In both
cases, the victims sue Mr X and the evidence at trial reveals major
flaws in the way in which the roof had been repaired due to the
carelessness with which the job had been executed.  Thus, in both
trials, Mr X is proven negligent and is ordered to pay damages.
• No character evidence condition: ---NO TEXT IS PROVIDED ---
One day, Mr X is asked by Mr Y to repair his tailed house roof.  12 years
after Mr X had repaired the roof, a violent whirlwind hits the roof.  When
hit by the whirlwind the roof is severely damaged.  In the state in which the
accident occurred house owners are not required to insure their house and
independent contractors are not required to buy liability insurance.  In the
case above, neither Mr X nor Mr Y were insured.  Because Mr Y believes that
flaws in the roof reparation made the roof more vulnerable to the whirl-
wind, he decides to sue Mr X for damages.
At the trial, Mr Y argues that Mr X did not exercise due care when repairing
the roof and that the roof would not have been damaged had it been prop-
erly repaired.  Mr X denies not having taken due care. In addition, Mr X
argues that he cannot be held liable for the accident because the whirlwind
was so violent that it would have damaged the roof regardless of how much
care was exercised when repairing it.  Meteorological data show that it was
the first time in the last century that a whirlwind hit that area.  The expert
report establishes that it is possible for a badly repaired roof to last 12
years.  However, in the present case, the expert report is not able to estab-
lish whether Mr X exercised due care when repairing the roof.
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After you have carefully read the story above, please answer the following
questions:









Mr X is not
responsible at all
Mr X is fully
responsible
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0%  ______  100%






Not at all Very much1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
1) To what extent do you think that Mr X has a history of not repairing roofs
properly?  Please answer on a 1 to 7 degree scale (circling a number).
2) What do you personally think was/were the cause/s of the accident?  Please
answer on a 1 to 7 degree scale (circling a number).
3) If you were the judge presiding over this case, to what extent would you
rule that Mr X is responsible for the accident?  Please answer on a 1 to 7
degree scale (circling a number).
4) If you were the judge presiding over this case, which percentage of the
damage would you require Mr X to pay?  Answer this question indicating a
percentage.
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